On the Validational Argument

 On the Validational Argument

 

I recently re-encountered the Ontological Argument. I found it annoying, and wondered why. Then I remembered a friend’s recasting of the Ontological Dilemma; why is there something rather than nothing? He quoted Wittgenstein; “the world is that which is the case”; and he recast the dilemma in terms of facts rather than things. That is, why are there any facts? He then noted that the contrary nihilist hypothesis - that there are no facts - is like Epimenides of Crete, denying the honesty of all Cretans. If there are no facts, then the nihilist hypothesis is a fact as much as it is not. Therefore there is at least one truth or at least one paradox. Specifically, the assertion that some fact is true is itself either a truth or a paradox, and in either case not an outright falsehood.

So the manuevre of changing ‘thing’ issues into ‘fact’ issues sheds some light onto the Ontological Dilemma. What of the Ontological Argument? I recast it thus, as an “Validational Argument”:

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The mind can conceive of various philosophical arguments. Some are better than others. Now consider the best philosophical argument, one better than which cannot be conceived. Either it is valid or it is not. Clearly it would be better if it were valid.

Therefore the best conceivable argument, better than which none can be conceived, is a valid one.

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Note that this Validational Argument is indeed valid, simply because its conclusion is foregone. Of course the best argument is a valid one! That’s practically the definition of validity!

Note also that the Validational Argument has no existential import. The best conceivable philosophical argument need not exist, for perhaps all arguments are somewhat invalid. All we can conclude is that any best-conceivable-argument, if there be any at all, is valid.

Nor does the Validational Argument imply uniqueness. There may be several best-conceivable arguments, all valid, but not equivalent; and combining them may not improve them.

“The best conceivable argument is a valid one”: the Validational Argument reduces to an appeal to reason!

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Are there any valid arguments at all? If not, then the Irrationalist Argument, “All philosophical arguments are invalid” would be as valid as it is not.

Therefore there is either validity or there is paradox. In particular, the Rationalist Argument, “Some philosophical arguments are valid” would either be valid or paradoxical; and in either case, not outright false.

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Now, the famous Ontological Argument argues for a greatest-conceivable entity, which must by definition exist. The trouble with this is that it assumes that existence improves an entity’s greatness.

But why assume that? Existence is by nature limited, conditional, relational; this tends to preclude greatness. This undermines the ontological argument.

Consider, for instance, the strange case of Santa Claus. Nominally an object of near-religious belief, in capitalist society he actually functions as a childhood initiation into skepticism. Inevitably the child realizes that There Ain’t No Santa Claus; a shattering revelation, a mini-Enlightenment, the fall of a god; and from this the child picks up some all-important Sales Resistance. Santa Claus is a kind of patron saint of skepticism; he dies and is not reborn; yet his very absence is his power. Because Santa does not exist, you can attribute powers to him impossible to anything limited by existing; and in his disappearance he teaches a valuable lesson in critical thinking.

Now, the mind can conceive of various Santa Clauses. Some are better than others. Now consider the best Santa Claus, one better than which cannot be conceived. Either he exists or he does not.

Any existing Santa Claus would inevitably be a disappointment, being limited by existence; and would not provide any philosophical instruction by vanishing. Clearly a non-existent Santa would be better.

Therefore the best Santa Claus, better than which none can be conceived, does not exist.